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CHAP T ER

IV

The Nordic Model in an
Int e r n a t i o n a l P e r s p e c t i v e
The Role of Ownership
A comment by Ronald J. Gilson*

It is commonplace to credit the invention of the public corporation as an important engine of economic growth. The creation
of a long-lived vehicle that gave investors both tradable shares
and limited liability allowed talented managers to raise capital
to fund enterprise. Writing in 1926, the Economist magazine
heralded this role:
The economic historian of the future may assign to the nameless
inventor of the principle of limited liability, as applied to trading
corporations, a place of honor with Watt and Stephenson, and
other pioneers of the Industrial Revolution. The genius of these
men produced the means by which man’s command of natural
resources has multiplied many times over; the limited liabil-

* Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School, Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia Law School and Fellow, European Corporate Governance Institute.
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ity company the means by which huge aggregations of capital
required to give effect to their discoveries were collected, organized and efficiently administered.1

During both the industrial revolution of the 19th century and
the digital revolution of the 21st, innovation had to be organized to succeed. The innovation represented by the corporate
form was the vehicle for the industrial and technological innovations that define these periods. Nonetheless, this gem of an
organizational form had two deep flaws that were apparent
from the outset, one of which goes to the misaligned incentives
between management and shareholders, and the other goes to
the difficulty of aligning them. Adam Smith, in The Wealth of
Nations, identified the first flaw in the late 18th century – what
we now call the agency problem:
The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being
the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own,
it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with
the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private
copartnery frequently watch over their own … Negligence and
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the
management of the affairs of such a company.2

So someone has to watch management to make sure that managers work diligently for the shareholders. But this is hard
to do. Two hundred years later, Dr. Seuss – the pen name of
Theodor Geisel, who is the most beloved American children’s
author – captured the second flaw as well as any economist and
in a much more amusing manner:

1. Economist, Dec. 18, 1926.
2. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations: An Inquiry into Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776).

95

96

CHAP T ER IV

Oh, the jobs people work at! Out west near Hawtch-Hawtch
there’s a Hawtch-Hawtcher bee watcher, his job is to watch. Is to
keep both his eyes on the lazy town bee, a bee that is watched will
work harder you see. So he watched and he watched, but in spite
of his watch that bee didn’t work any harder not mawtch. So then
somebody said »Our old bee-watching man just isn’t bee watching as hard as he can, he ought to be watched by another HawtchHawtcher! The thing that we need is a bee-watcher-watcher!«.
Well, the bee-watcher-watcher watched the bee-watcher. He
didn’t watch well so another Hawtch-Hawtcher had to come in
as a watch-watcher-watcher! And now all the Hawtchers who
live in Hawtch-Hawtch are watching on watch watcher watchering watch, watch watching the watcher who’s watching that bee.
You’re not a Hawtch-Watcher you’re lucky you see!3

To date, much of corporate governance scholarship and practice has been, in effect, a search for organizational cold fusion.
Can we design a cost-effective monitoring technique, whether
internal to the corporation like independent directors or external to the corporation though markets like the market for corporate control, that will cause management to work only in the
shareholders’ interests and so reduce the divergence between
interests to levels low enough that it will not operate as a drag
on performance? The difficulty is that incentive-compatible
governance techniques are both difficult to design and expensive. For example, paying directors enough to get their full
attention may be inconsistent with their independence, a problem that gets worse the more complex the business becomes.
Takeovers, in turn, are blunt instruments, and the large premiums associated with them imply a significant level of poor per-

3. Dr. Seuss (T. Geisel), Did I Ever Tell You How Lucky You Are? (1973).
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formance before they are triggered.4 Indeed, there is evidence
that those banks whose corporate governance most closely
aligned the interests of shareholders and managers fared worst
in the recent financial crisis.5
But there is another approach to the agency problem that
has received less attention in the corporate governance debate
– an active owner, in contrast to passive shareholders, has the
right incentives to either run the corporation well herself, or to
monitor carefully the performance of the managers she hires.
This brings us to the subject of this volume: Nordic corporate
governance, or what I will call an ownership model of corporate governance.

An ownership model
of corporate governance
An ownership model of corporate governance takes as its
premise the simple intuition that an active owner will be a more
effective and less costly monitor of management than the techniques associated with the governance of public corporations
having widely dispersed shareholdings.6 But the analysis gets
more complicated when the owner needs to raise equity capital. Once you add public shareholders to the mix, a different
4. R. J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harvard Law Review 1641
(2006).
5. A. Beltratti and R. M. Stulz, The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why
did some Banks Perform Better?, 105 Journal of Financial Economics. 1
(2012).
6. R. J. Gilson and A. Schwartz, Constraints on Private Benefits of Control:
Ex Ante Control Mechanisms versus Ex Post Transaction Review, 169 Journal
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160 (2013).
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form of agency cost arises: the owner’s incentive to secure private benefits of control. An owner that holds less than all of the
company’s equity has an incentive to divert profits to herself,
for example through related-party transactions, rather than
sharing them with public shareholders either by keeping the
profits in the corporation or paying them out in dividends. The
potential for diversion of private benefits of control also has
allocative and not just distributional consequences. Different
kinds of businesses are differentially susceptible to divergence
of private benefits; for example, vertical integration creates the
potential for large numbers of related transactions that can disproportionately favor the controlling shareholder. Therefore,
the optimal form of organization from the perspective of the
controlling shareholder may no longer be the most efficient
but, instead, the form that maximizes the combination of efficient production and the capacity to divert private benefits.
At this point, the agency problem posed by owners gets
complicated. First, if the company must sell equity to finance
its growth (because the owner lacks the resources herself), the
control that gives the owner the ability to act as an effective,
low-cost monitor is diluted, and the combination of success
and growth opportunities becomes self-defeating. The obvious
solution, common to the Nordic countries as shown in the
country reports in this volume, is for the owner to retain control by having the company sell to the public shares with lower
voting rights than the stocks held by the owner – the controlling shareholder levers control through dual-class common
stock.7 But the use of leveraged control to solve the first owneragency problem presented by the addition of public shareholders exacerbates the second. The larger the difference between
7. The Nordic countries differ somewhat along this dimension. The Norway Report states that although Norwegian law does allow two classes of common stock with different voting rights, it is rarely used.
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the owner’s share of the vote and her share of the equity, the
stronger her incentive to extract private benefits of control.8
And so one confronts a vicious circle: the more successful the
business and the greater its growth opportunities, the more
capital that must be raised through a dual stock structure, the
bigger the divergence between the controlling shareholder’s
voting rights and her equity stake, and so the greater her incentive to divert private benefits of control. This leads to the third
and potentially most significant owner-agency problem. Since
public shareholders will expect that an owner will divert private benefits of control unless the owner can credibly commit
not to do so (or can set a credible cap on the amount of diversion), the cost of equity capital will be driven up, with negative
consequences for the company’s success in its business and its
capacity to grow.9

How the Nordic ownership model
of corporate governance responds to the
agency problems of ownership
The overview study and the country studies of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden in this volume tell a single, coherent story. First, active owners dominate publicly held Nordic
companies. As shown in Figure ii.1 on page 50, 62 % of companies in the region have at least one shareholder that holds
more than 20 % of the votes and 21 % have a shareholder that
8. See, for example, S. Classens, S. Djankov and L.H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 Journal of
Financial Economics 81 (2000).
9. R. J. Gilson and A. Schwartz, Contracting Over Private Benefits of Control, available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2182781 (July, 2013).
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holds more than 50 % of the votes. Characterizing Nordic corporate governance as an ownership model is plainly correct:
public companies are dominated by active owners.10 Thus, the
first governance problem that confronts an ownership model
– how the active owner maintains a controlling position while
the company grows – seems to have been solved in the Nordic
region.
Second, these companies are successful. As shown in Table
i.1 on page 28 the number of Nordic companies among the
Forbes 2000 largest global companies exceeds that of Germany, despite the fact that Germany’s gdp is twice that of the Nordic region. Thus, the second and third problems that confront
an ownership model of corporate governance also seem to have
been solved – the divergence of private benefits of control has
not risen to levels that affect Nordic companies’ cost of equity
capital or success – as can be inferred by the fact that large-cap
listed companies represent some 88 % of the market value of
shares listed on the Nordic exchanges (Table ii.3, p. 46).
This section reviews the legal structure that supports the
Nordic ownership model. The next section then considers the
Nordic ownership model from a comparative perspective, with
particular attention to an issue that has figured prominently in
the corporate governance literature: whether different national
and regional corporate governance systems are converging.
10. For present purposes, I will ignore a different corporate governance
model found in the Nordic region: the »no owner« governance model represented by the Danish industrial foundations. In the foundations, no individual
or for-profit company bears the residual risk of the company’s performance;
voting control is lodged in a non-profit foundation. Here the puzzle is that,
despite a governance model that has neither an active owner nor dispersed
shareholders, these businesses are on average as profitable as public corporations with more familiar governance models. See H. Hansmann and S. Thomsen, Firms without Owners: The Governance of Industrial Foundations, working paper, Feb. 2014.
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Legal rules
The legal rules that support the Nordic ownership model of
corporate governance in each of the countries are straightforward. Consider first the initial problem that must be solved in
an ownership model: companies must be able to raise additional equity capital without so diluting the controlling shareholders’ ownership of voting stock that they lose control. This is
accomplished in Denmark, Finland and Sweden by the use of
dual-class common stock, where the controlling shareholder
owns shares with multiple voting rights (typically 10 votes
per share) and the public shareholders own shares with only
a single vote. Thus, companies can raise substantial amounts
of equity without the controlling shareholder losing control.11
While the use of dual-class control to maintain control
despite equity sales is straightforward, it is not the only way to
accomplish that goal. For example, complex webs of circular
ownership and related but non-transparent ownership can also
allow a controlling shareholder to leverage her voting control.
A recent comparison of the ownership structure of the Korean
Samsung group and that of the Wallenberg group in Sweden,
which is anchored through the family’s dual class-based con11. Interestingly, Norway differs in this important respect. As described in
the country report for Norway, company law allows the use of different classes
of common stock with different voting rights, but only three listed companies
have other than a single class of stock: ownership and voting rights coincide
rather than diverge. This is something of a puzzle in that the percentage of
Norwegian companies with a 20 % and 50 % shareholder is higher than the
average for the Nordic region. No explanation for this different pattern is
offered; however, one may speculate that it may be related to the fact that the
Norwegian government is the largest investor in listed Norwegian companies,
holding approximately 35 % of the outstanding stock (spread across only 8
large companies). In that circumstance, the government may be the ultimate
arbiter of control.
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trol of Investor ab, highlights the differences between circular
ownership and dual-class common stock as a means to leverage control.12 As discussed above, the risk posed by leveraged
control is the controlling shareholder’s increased incentive to
divert private benefits of control. While the Wallenberg group’s
control relationship based on dual class common stock is
transparent, Professor Kim argues that the complex circular
ownership linking the units of the Korean Samsung chaebol is
opaque and therefore facilitates diversion of private benefits
of control. If the solution to the problem of allowing an active
owner to maintain control of a growing company is leveraged
control, then ownership relationships must be transparent so
that related transactions that may serve as vehicles for diverting private benefits of control can be tracked. Professor Kim
notes that Korean corporate law prohibits dual-class common
stock but allows complex circular ownership, and argues that
monitoring private benefits would be improved were the legal
status of the two techniques reversed.
That brings us to the second problem that must be addressed
in an ownership model of corporate governance: a controlling shareholder’s incentive to take private benefits of control
increases as her equity stake decreases. An ownership model’s
success thus depends on limiting private benefits of control.
While the details differ somewhat across the four countries,
the basic structures of the four Nordic countries’ corporate law
regimes set out in this volume reveal a common strategy to constrain private benefits of control. Put most simply, the annual
general meeting is given plenary power, approval by qualified majorities based on equity ownership rather than voting
rights is required for sensitive actions like directed issuances of
12. Hwa-Jin Kim, Concentrated Ownership and Corporate C
 ontrol: Wallenberg Sphere and Samsung Group, available at htto://ssrn.com/abstract=
2463272 (2014).
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shares, and the board or agm is prohibited from taking actions
that advantage a controlling shareholder at the expense of the
minority.
While these protections are clear enough, their effectiveness depends importantly on the extent to which they can be
effectively enforced: do the courts and the four corporate-law
regimes give minority shareholders an economically and substantively feasible means to challenge actions they deem unduly favorable to the controlling shareholder? Professors Guido
Ferrarini and Paolo Guidici highlight this point with respect to
the Italian Parmalat scandal, which involved the diversion of
large amounts of private benefits of control through relatedparty transactions:
[I]talian substantive rules cannot be blamed for what happened.
Indeed, we argue … that the existing Italian substantive rules that
were in place during Parmalat’s last decade were sufficient and,
somewhat surprisingly, were even more severe than those in the
us. If Italian gatekeepers were undeterred, do not blame Italian
substantive rules, blame enforcement.13

Here the concern is not just with substantive legal rules that
identify what actions will be found to unduly favor a controlling shareholder, but as well with the civil procedure rules that
identify who can challenge those actions and the economics of
that process, especially with respect to the ability to share the
costs of the litigation across all minority shareholders.

13. G. Ferrarini and P. Guidici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private
Enforcement: The Parmalat Case, in After Enron 159 (J. Armour and J. McCahery, eds. 2006).
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Non-legal constraints on private benefits of control
It is obvious that non-legal arrangements are important constraints on the consumption of private benefits of control. Controlling shareholders are commonplace in developing countries where courts cannot be expected to operate effectively
to constrain private benefits of control; publicly held minority
shares nonetheless sell at a positive if still discounted price.14
Thus, controlling shareholders must adopt observable strategies that operate to credibly cap the extent of private benefits.
These strategies can be grouped in two general categories: reputation-based commitment and structural commitment.15
The first category builds on the premise that if a controlling
shareholder can be expected to return to the capital market, the
company’s anticipated cost of capital will reflect the observed
level of private benefits. Thus, controlling shareholders with
a penchant for self-dealing will face a higher cost of capital
and so will bear the cost of self-dealing. Family-controlled
conglomerates and broad, state-controlling ownership, both
common in countries without effective legal systems, operate
to expand the effectiveness of reputation-based enforcement
through repeated transactions by extending the number of
companies that may come back to the capital market to raise
equity.
The second category is comprised of techniques where the
structure of the controlled company’s business itself impedes
a controlling shareholder’s diversion of private benefits. For
example, a familiar means of private-benefit transactions is
through related-party transactions between companies in a
14. R. J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, Stanford Law Review 60, 633 634–35
(2007).
15. Gilson and Schwartz, supra note 9.

The Nordic Model in an International Perspective

vertically integrated controlled pyramid. If the controlling
shareholder has a larger equity stake in the upstream input
supplier, transfer prices favorable to the supplier will transfer private benefits of control. The absence of vertical supply
arrangements in a controlled conglomerate may then serve as a
credible commitment – through industrial organization rather
than reputation or the legal system – that private benefits will
be limited.

An ownership-based governance
model in a comparative perspective
Comparative corporate governance for some time had a teleological perspective: Anglo-American, widely dispersed shareholdings and the related market-based governance model
allowed for specialization of management and of risk-bearing,
and so was seen as the most efficient corporate structure; other
systems, including those characterized by controlling shareholders, were just less advanced on the development path.
The expectation was that, in the end, we would observe convergence on the market-based model. This analysis suffered
from serious shortcomings. First, it ignored significant overlaps among the systems. The United States, for example, has a
significant number of both public companies with controlling
shareholders16 and companies whose controlling sharehold-

16. In the United States, approximately 15 % of the s &p 500 companies
are family-controlled. R.C. Anderson and D.M. Reeb, Founding Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the s &p 500, 58 Journal of
Finance. 1301 (2003),
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ers leverage their control through dual-class common stock.17
At the same time, countries that are characterized as having
controlling shareholders systems also had significant numbers
of public corporations without a controlling shareholder. As
Figure ii.1 in the overview chapter shows, on average almost
40 % of the companies listed on the primary Nordic stock markets do not have a 20 % shareholder.
Second, the convergence analysis ignored the fact that in
some countries characterized by dispersed shareholders and
those characterized by controlling shareholders, minority
shares traded at quite small discounts; there seemed to be little difference among governance systems so long as controlling
shareholders had the capacity to credibly commit to limit private benefits of control. One is left with the conclusion that in
countries where there can be a credible commitment to limiting
private benefits of control, we will observe both dispersed and
concentrated ownership. If there is no convergence within a
single system, why should we expect it across systems?
The convergence question thus needs to be reformulated.
Properly framed, the issue is not whether we will see a convergence of governance systems, but rather whether we will see
a convergence of shareholder distribution. Here we observe
some indication of a kind of regression to the mean. On the one
hand, concentrated shareholdings are becoming more common in the United States, especially in the technology sector.
For example, from the beginning of 2010 through the end of
March 2011, 20 companies went public with dual-class common stock and other structural features that allowed controlling shareholders to retain control with a less-than-equivalent
17. As of the early 2000’s, approximately 6 % (by number, not value) of us
publicly traded corporations had dual-class common stock. P. A. Gompers, J.
Ishii and A. Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in
the United States, Review of Financial Studies 23 1051 (2010).
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equity stake.18 Facebook and Google are obvious examples.
Moreover, there is good reason to expect the pattern of
some controlling shareholders going public but keeping control
through leveraged structures – an ownership-based governance system – to persist. From the perspective of a controlling
shareholder going public in a country with a low discount for
expected private benefits of control, retaining control through
dual-class stock can usefully be thought of as an option. The
controlling shareholder buys the right to retain control indefinitely, paying an option price equal to the discount (assumed to
be small in a low-discount country) on the stock the controlling
shareholder sells plus her pro rata share (based on her equity
stake) of stock sold by the company. If the discount grows in
the future, the controlling shareholder can exercise her option
by causing the unification of the two classes of common stock.
At the same time, one might also expect the number of older
controlling share companies in countries with an ownership
governance model to decrease over time. Some companies will
be the subject of a takeover; in Sweden, for example, Rolf Skog
reports that Swedish companies with dual-class common stock
are no less likely to be a target of a takeover than companies
with dispersed shareholders.19 Others will be subject to what
I have called the »gravity of generations,« which can lead to
breaking up large family-controlled businesses as the number
of family members, and the divergence of their interests, grow
over time and a correspondingly smaller number have direct
involvement in the business.20
18. ir rc Institute, Controlled Companies in the Standard & Poor´s 1500:
A Ten Year Performance and Risk Review (2012).
19. R. Skog, The Takeover Directive, the »Breakthrough« Rule and
the Swedish System of Dual Class Common Stock, European Business Law
Review, 15, 6 (2004).
20. Gilson, supra note 4, at 1668. The percentage of companies dual class
shares listed in the Stockholm Stock Exchange declined from 87 % (202 com-
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The overall result is unpredictable – the initial distribution
of controlling shareholders among countries that can support
both concentrated and dispersed shareholder distributions
appears to be based on historical conditions with the future
likely to be based on the business dynamic in the country. As
such, is there any prediction about the distribution of shareholdings that can be made with some confidence?
In fact, there is one quite clear prediction that applies both
to the United States and to the Nordic region: the increasing
importance of institutional shareholders. Take the United
States first. In 1950, the shares of publicly traded corporations
were largely held by households; institutional investors, including pension funds, held only some 6.1 % of us equities. By
1980, however, shareholdings had begun to shift from households to institutions. At that time, institutions held 28.4 % of
us equities. By 2009, institutional investors held 50.6 % of all
us public equities and 73 % of the equity of the 1,000 largest
us corporations.21 Table iv.1 sets out the institutional ownership of different size cohorts of us public corporations in 2009.
Moreover, the institutional holdings were quite concentrated. Table iv.2 sets out the percentage of the outstanding stock
held in 2009 by the 25 largest institutions in the 10 largest us
corporations in which there was not a controlling owner. One
could presumably put around a large boardroom table representatives of institutions that together control some of the largest companies in the United States.
Thus, us shareholdings are hardly widely distributed. At
panies in 1992) to 49 % (255 companies in 2010). This also suggests that
the bulk of new listings did not have dual class shares. M. Henrekson and U.
Jakobsson, The Swedish Corporate Control Model: Convergence, Persistance
or Decline? ifn working paper # 857, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (2011).
21. The Conference Board, 2010 Institutional Investment Report: Trends
in Asset Allocation and Portfolio Composition, Table 10 (2011) .
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Table IV.1 Institutional ownership of largest US corporations in 2009.
Corporation Rank by Size

Institutional Ownership (%)

Top 50

63.7

Top 100

66.9

Top 250

69.3

Top 500

72.8

Top 750

73.9

Top 1,000

73.0

Source: The Conference Board, 2010 Institutional Investment Report: Trends in Asset
Allocation and Portfolio Composition, Table 13 (2011).

Table IV.2 Percentage of outstanding stock in 10 largest US corporations
without a controlling shareholder held by 25 largest institutions in 2009.

Corporation (in order of size)

Percentage of Stock Held
by 25 Largest Institutions(%)

Exxon-Mobil

25.0

Microsoft

31.9

Apple

37.0

GE	24.8
Procter & Gamble

29.1

Bank of America

28.9

JP Morgan Chase

35.8

Johnson & Johnson

29.6

IBM

30.6

Wells Fargo

44.3

Source: The Conference Board, 2010 Institutional Investment Report: Trends in Asset
Allocation and Portfolio Composition, Table 13 (2011).
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the level of the record owner institution, as opposed to the
institution’s beneficiaries, us shareholdings have dramatically
reconcentrated. The result is a governance structure that Jeffrey Gordon and I have called »agency capitalism«,22 with its
own distinctive form of agency costs. Here, the institutions’
business model comes between the record (institutional) and
beneficial owners. The evidence is that with only occasional
exceptions, institutional investors exhibit a peculiar form of
passivity: not »apathy« but »reticence«. They are unlikely
to be proactive in taking advantage of the governance rights
associated with their shareholdings, but will vote thoughtfully
if the issue is clearly framed for them.
The same shift in shareholdings, from individual to institutional ownership, is also evident in the Nordic region. As
described in the chapter on Sweden in this volume, in the early
1950’s, individuals held nearly 75 % of the market capitalization (but not necessarily the vote) of the Stockholm Stock
Exchange. Family-controlled foundations, closed-end investment companies and holding companies owned the remainder.
As Skog and Sjöman put it: »Institutional investors were practically non-existent at the time.«
As in the United States, institutional investor holdings then
grew dramatically. By the mid-1980’s, individuals owned only
25 % of the market capitalization, and by 2014, individual
equity ownership had dropped to 15 %, with institutional
investors holding 85 %.
We have thus observed the same shift in ownership pattern in both the United States – widely treated as the quintessential dispersed-shareholder market – and in Sweden, widely
viewed as the quintessential controlling-shareholder system.
22. R. J. Gilson and J. N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Columbia
Law Review. 883 (2013).
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What has been the result of this common shift in shareholder
distribution in the two different systems?
In the United States, the reconcentration of ownership
in institutional investors has given rise to activist investors
whose strategy is symbiotic with that of the intermediary institutional investors. The activists identify companies whose
performance they believe can be significantly improved, buy
a toe-hold stake, and then seek to convince the institutional
shareholders of the wisdom of the activist’s strategic proposal.
If intermediary institutional owners agree, they vote for the
activist’s position by voting for the activist’s board nominees
in a proxy contest; if institutions do not think the proposal is
sound, it is likewise voted down. The institutions determine the
outcome. The activist investor does not itself control sufficient
stock to control the election; its pre-disclosure holdings seem
to be around 8 %.23 Thus, in the us agency capitalism world,
the activist investor proposes, and the institutional investors
dispose, a division of labor that takes advantage of each of the
participants’ competencies.24
But what is the impact in Sweden (and presumably the rest
of the Nordic region) of the reconcentration of individual holdings into institutional holdings? For those companies that do
not have at least a 20 % block, the potential is for the us pattern to appear, and perhaps even more powerfully because of
shareholders’ greater access to the annual general meeting and
the greater power of the meeting than in the us. For companies with 20 % or more blockholders, a different issue arises:
what is the impact of minority institutional blockholders in a
corporation with a controlling shareholder? Here, the experi23. L. Bebchuk, A. Brav, R. Jackson and W. Jiang, Pre-Disclosure Accumulation by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 Journal of Corporation
Law (2013).
24. Gilson and Gordon, supra note 23.
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ence of Chile may be relevant. On the one hand, Chilean public
corporations typically have a controlling shareholder. On the
other hand, the five Chilean private pension funds that arose
out of the 1981 pension reform are major shareholders with,
collectively, sufficient shares to elect a director in many corporations.25 Here, the issue is one of strategy. Where exit is limited
because of the limited market liquidity in the Chilean market
and the size of the pension funds’ holdings, can voice have an
impact even in the face of a controlling shareholder? What
is the impact in Sweden, for example, of the fact that foreign
institutional investors hold 40 % of the market capitalization?

Conclusion
The Nordic ownership model of corporate governance is built
on facilitating an active owner’s retention of control as the
company grows through the leverage of dual-class stock, and
aggressively protecting minority shareholders from private
benefits of control so that the company’s cost of equity is not
adversely affected by the characteristic control structure. So
long as non-control shareholdings were largely held by individuals, a smaller equity stake could support control. The combination of an active owner and protected minority shareholders
was a successful alternative to the intellectual hegemony of the
Anglo-Saxon, market-based governance model.
Thus, it may be that the character of the shareholding
distribution at the heart of the Nordic ownership model has
25. oecd, The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corporate Governance 90 (2011). The funds’ ability to elect a director is facilitated
by cumulative voting and statutory authority to cooperate in the election of
directors.
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two dimensions, not just one. In addition to the presence of
an activist owner, the model may also depend to some extent
on the absence of concentrated minority block holders. What
happens when minority ownership reconcentrates in institutional investors? What role can institutional investors play?
Corporate governance is shaped by the evolution of the capital
market and the resulting ownership patterns. Ownership patterns have now changed dramatically. We are then left with
the question of how the Nordic ownership model of corporate
governance adapts.
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